Hassan Dai, November 1, 2021

Since 2018, as rebel forces have been largely defeated and the military conflict has subsided, IRGC and Hezbollah have decreased their military presence. However, they have established numerous military bases and continue to have thousands of troops in strategic areas of the country.

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In early 2012, The Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Lebanese Hezbollah deployed limited numbers of troops to Syria, mostly in Damascus to prevent Army gained the collapse of Bashar Assad regime. But, the rebel forces led by the Free Syria Army continued their advance and in July 2012, they controlled significant parts of the country and launched the large-scale operation in the capital Damascus reaching the outskirts of the Presidential palace. At this point, Iran and Hezbollah intervened massively to prevent the save of the Assad regime.

This military intervention increased afterward and picked during 2015 and the battle for the control of Aleppo through 2017 when IRGC and its proxies launched the operation for the control of Syrian-Iraqi borders especially Al-Boukamal border crossing. During this time, IRGC, Iran regular army, Hezbollah and Quds Force proxies deployed tens of thousands of troops in Syria, including Iraqi Shiite militias, Fatemiyoun, the Afghan division of Quds Force and, Zeynabiyoun, the Pakistani division. At the same time, IRGC recruited tens of thousands of Syrians and formed the National Defense Forces (NDF). Many of NDF members were trained in IRGC camps in Iran.

Since 2018, as rebel forces have been largely defeated and the military conflict has subsided, IRGC and Hezbollah have decreased their military presence. However, they have established numerous military bases and continue to have thousands of troops in strategic areas of the country.. As Anchal Vohra, a Beirut-based columnist for Foreign Policy has written in Foreign Policy: “a decade into the conflict, Iran-backed militias control the outskirts of Damascus and patrol the strategic towns on the Syria-Lebanon border. They are present in large numbers in southern Syria near Israel, have multiple bases in Aleppo, and since the Islamic State’s defeat in 2018 have also set up camp in towns and villages on the Syria-Iraq border.”

Iran’s ultimate goal is to maintain a long-term presence in this country. To achieve this strategy, Iran is using new initiatives to maintain its military influence. For example, during the past several years, IRGC has formed “local defense forces” in different part of Syria. These militias include former members of NDF who remain loyal to Tehran and new recruits, most of them, young Syrians with no source of income who are easy prey for Iran’s offer of cash, or, former rebels who try to avoid regime’s vengeance for their past.

Iran has also some influence in the Syrian army and collaborates with specific brigades within the army in several key areas in the country. IRGC is also hiring and using private security companies which operate in sensitive areas and in Damascus.

Iran has also established numerous military bases in Syria, notably the Imam Ali base near the Abu Kamal border crossing and the T-4 base located west of Palmyra.

The bases have been repeatedly targeted by Israeli and US airstrikes which can provide information about their exact location. (See Timeline: Israel-Iran tensions in Syria)

Map of Israeli airstrikes against IRGC bases in Syria during the first half of 2018. Source, Haaretz

Another related map is also available at  https://www.reddit.com/r/MapPorn/comments/kbsf47/control_in_syria_and_foreign_military_bases/

Details about Iran and Hezbollah current military presence in Syria

The Syrian expert Navvar Saban, has detailed the Iranian presence in an important report titled “Iranian Influence and presence in Syria” that was published by Atlantic Council in November 2020. He wrote:

“During the last several years, the Iranian military involvement in Syria has grown and become more visible, which has made targeting them an easy job for the Israeli air force. As a result, in 2017-2018, Iran had to find a different approach for its military involvement in order to protect its militias. Iran then began the ambitious plan of redefining its presence in Syria by creating the Local Defense Forces (LDF), supporting specific brigades within the Syrian army and, most recently, establishing local private security companies.

Local Militias

Iran encouraged the Shia minority in Syria to form special militias and recruited Sunnis—especially clans—in the provinces of Aleppo, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor. In addition, some of the Shia militias in Syria were and continue to be recruited on a sectarian basis under the pretext of defending places considered holy by the Shia community. For example, campaigns are being conducted in the areas housing holy Shia shrines in Damascus in the Sayeda Zeinab district.  After individuals are recruited, they are sent for about twenty-one to forty-five days of light and medium arms training and sometimes for six months for heavy weapons training. The Syrian militias backed or formed by Iran are divided into several groups.

Local Defense Forces: Iran recruited fighters from the provinces of Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, and Raqqa under the name of the Local Defense Forces (LDF). The LDF are considered part of the Syrian army and have over fifty thousand fighters. The most prominent militias within the framework are considered to be the Nayrab Brigades (Special Operations), al-Sefira Corps, al-Baqir Brigade, the Nubul and Zahra Brigades, and the Qatraji forces.

Syrian Shia militias: Iran recruited from the Shia minority in Syria; mainly from northern Aleppo, northern Homs, and parts of Raqqa. The Syrian Shia militias have an estimated five thousand to eight thousand fighters. The most prominent of these militias include: the Aleppo branch of the Imam al-Hajjah, the Mahdi soldiers and the Mahdi Army in Nubul and Zahra, the Damascus branch of the Rukia Brigade, the Idlib branch of the al-Waed al-Sadiq Corps, the Homs branch of the forces of Imam Reza, Zin El Abidin Brigade, the Deir ez-Zor branch of the Brigade 313 Busra al-Sham in Daraa, and Al-Mukhtar Al-Thaqafi Brigade (Lattakia and Hama), among others.

Syrian private security companies affiliated with Iran

Before May 2013, the activities of private security companies in Syria were limited to securing shopping malls, banks, and concerts. The growing need for legal armed forces not bound by government regulation led to the issuance of Legislative Decree No. 55: a legal contract that allows militias to operate in Syria and use military force—depending on their contract—thereby allowing these entities to operate freely without needing to report to Assad’s army or security branches.

Iran used private security companies to insert Iranian influence in sensitive Syrian areas, such as the capital, Damascus, without concerns about maintaining this presence in the future, because private security companies are under the guise of a registered Syrian company. Iran found private security to be an ideal way to maintain a presence in strategic locations, like the Baghdad-Damascus highway in the eastern desert of Syria.”

Fabrice Balanche, a Middle East expert and Washington Institute fellow has also mapped the Iranian presence in Syria in a February 2021 report titled “The Assad Regime Has Failed to Restore Full Sovereignty Over Syria”. He writes:

“Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed Shia militias currently control around 20 percent of the country’s borders. Although Syrian customs authorities are officially in charge of the crossings with Iraq (Abu Kamal), Jordan (Nasib), and Lebanon (al-Arida, Jdeidat, al-Jousiyah, and al-Dabousiyah), the reality is that true control lies elsewhere. The Lebanese border is occupied by Hezbollah, which has established bases on the Syrian side (Zabadani, al-Qusayr) from which it dominates the Qalamoun mountainous region. Similarly, Iraqi Shia militias manage both sides of their border from Abu Kamal to al-Tanf. The stranglehold of pro-Iranian forces also extends to several of Syria’s military airports, which often serve as receptacles for Iranian weapons destined for Hezbollah and the Golan Heights frontline with Israel. This situation reveals Syria’s complete integration into the Iranian axis.

In a report by published by INSS in December 2020, Udi Dekel and armit Valensi confirm that “in Southern Syria, Iran is determined to continue the consolidation of its proxies and enhance its local civilian and military influence. The current chaos in southern Syria stems from the Assad regime’s lack of effective control and the competing interests of the many actors that are active there: regime forces, local militias supported by Iran, Hezbollah, Russian forces, and the local Sunni and Druze population, which includes the remnants of the opposition to the Assad regime.”

The authors detail Iranian influence in the Syria army and local militias: “in Daraa, active in the area are local defense militias supported and trained by Iran, together with units from the 313th Brigade founded in a separate framework in the Syrian army under Iranian influence. Quneitra in the west, with about 90,000 residents, mostly Sunnis, features a more prominent regime, based on the 1st Corps of the Syrian army and Hezbollah presence. Suwayda in the east, is under the control of local Druze groups: this province features a growing presence of pro-Iranian groups, mainly the National Defense Forces.”

The authors underline the Iranian strategic goal in Syria: “Iran aims to strengthen its influence and consolidation in Syria and to deepen the grip of its proxies in the country by means of profound and multi-faceted penetration of the Syrian systems – defense, economy, education, society, culture, and religion – while gaining control of critical infrastructure, supporting pro-Iranian militias, engaging in Syrian military buildup, and promoting an ideological and demographic transformation. Furthermore, Iran is anchoring its presence in the southern Syrian provinces close to the Israeli border in order to create an additional front of friction and conflict with Israel through its proxies. Iran bribes local parties and arouses internal tensions in order to damage the social fabric and buy the loyalty of local groups, while at the same time disseminating Iranian regime ideology.”

The authors highlight the competition between Iran and Russia for influence in Syria:  “The prevailing dynamic in southern Syria in recent months and the frequent clashes between groups under Iranian influence and those affiliated with Russia indicate growing competition for influence between Russia and Iran and reflect those actors’ conflicting interests in the region, despite their partnership in the pro-Assad coalition.”

Dekel and Valensi point to the challenges and obstacle that Iran is facing to pursue its strategic goal for a long-term presence in Syria: “However, the United States policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran, continual Israeli attacks, and competition between Iran and Russia have slowed the pace of Iran’s consolidation and forced Tehran to change the nature of its deployment in southern Syria, despite its determination to strengthen its grip in Syria. In the past, Shiite militias from outside Syria operated in the area. Today, however, Iran relies on local groups – homeland defense forces and local defense militias that it recruits, equips, and trains; Syrian army units under Iranian influence (among them the 4th Division, under the command of Maher al-Assad); and especially Hezbollah. Two main Hezbollah groups are currently active in southern Syria: the Southern Command, which includes Hezbollah officers as advisers and supervisors in the Syrian army, and the Golan File Unit under direct Hezbollah command, which is establishing terrorist cells comprising local Syrians. Hezbollah is also a partner in Iranian activity in southern Syria, which goes beyond the military aspect, including the operation of a drug smuggling network, land purchases, and the provision of basic goods and services, in order to extend its influence and earn support in local public opinion.

Despite Iran’s determination to strengthen its grip on the area, it is now forced to downsize its activity there, due to budgetary constraints and Russia’s restraining measures. Russia itself, however, has only limited ability to curtail Iranian consolidation efforts in southern Syria, let alone expel Iran and its proxies from the area. The Assad regime has in effect adopted a “passive neutrality” in the competition between Russia and Iran, and allowed the local struggles between the various actors in order to let them wear each other out, and to prevent the emergence of a single dominant power in the area, particularly at the present time, when southern Syria is low on the regime’s list of priorities.”